Conference of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
'Search for Stability in the Caucasus '
Brussels, 25-26 October 2001, Brussels

Next steps in the Caucasus
Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci

The question is indeed: 'what next for the Caucasus?' in a new situation, Characterized by three recent negative developments.

The first was the fate of the 'almost-agreement' between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nogorno-Karabakh, which the Minsk Group co-chairs had mediated in April in Key West, Florida. This fe11 apart as the presidents retimed home, and political opinion in Baku in particular hardened, apparently demanding a higher degree of Azeri control over Nogorno-Karabkh. Various political groups have also been making more bellicose speeches. Now President Aliev is reported on 25 October as saying: 'Either the OSCE Minsk Group takes a principled position in this question or we will have to liberate our land by military means... So I think in this case the international community should take more active responsibility''

The second has been the continuing deterioration of the Abkhazia situation, and Between Georgia and Russia more widely. In October there were incursions of officially unidentified forces from Georgia into the Khodori district of Abkhazia, and the ensuing violence saw loss of life, with the appalling death of unarmed UN monitors whose helicopter was shot down. The unidentified forces moving into Khodori are widely reported to have been a mix of irregular Georgians and Chechnya's, the latter being a reminder of the unresolved problem of the Pankisi district of Georgia that harbors an unknown number of Chechnya's seeking safe haven there. Georgian political leaders have also been making more bellicose speeches. President Shevardnardze was reported as saying in a public speech on 11 October:' I am sure we will return to Abkhazia and it will happen very shortly. I will go ahead with you. We have more resources now and international support ...We are closer to victory than at any time before''.

The third was 11 September .How this huge tragedy affects the Caucasus is at this stage unclear. However the spectrum of scenarios certainly widens, for ill or for good.

Extrapolating the negatives, one can hear political speeches from the South Caucasus in which enemies are being newly labe11ed as terrorists, the implication being that there is a new license to use force. One can hear also the argument that now is the time to settle old scores, while the rest of the world is preoccupied elsewhere. Leaders are talking more explicitly about war in both the cases quoted above the message is also about international support. Even if such remarks may be discounted to a degree as domestic political posturing, it is nonetheless extraordinarily grave that the language and therefore logic of war is occupying the stage. It is also spreading illusions to the home public that international support is either available, or should be so, behind threats of war.

On the other hand, and notwithstanding the above, there is also the idea that out of the tragedy can come some good, if people can achieve a fresh sense of perspective. This means weighing in a new light the costs and benefits of peaceful political compromises versus fighting wars over absolutist nationalistic and/or ethno-cultural divide. The parties to various conflicts may see that there are no local conflicts anymore. Parties to conflicts should be observing that there is now a po1arisation of the world between, on the one hand, those who want to stop violence of a11 kinds, since terrorism and other types of violent conflict come together like bacteria which feed on each other, and, on the other hand, those who are determined still to go on in old ways: 'are you with us, or against us?'

These ideas that some good can come from the evil are not just theory or fantasy .One may notice the case of Northern Ireland in recent days, where one party had long been resisting disarmament, but now judges that it is time to switch from the miserable condition of simmering or frozen conflict towards a real peace.

Can such logic make its way now in the Caucasus as we11, reversing the ominous? negative developments already reported? The parties to the unresolved conflicts may heed the words of Ambassador Sanberk at the beginning of this conference: ''the rest of the world is running out of patience with the Caucasus''. Might this mean that the major powers wash their hands of this sorry? Region? Or might it mean that they choose to deploy the energies and resources of their fresh a1liance -with the US, Russia, EU and Turkey all moving together like never before -for more pro-active diplomacy in this region, to get solutions. Both the Abkhazia and Nogorno-Karabakh conflicts have been subject of patient but fairly passive diplomacy for years. The word has tended to be: 'what you can agree, we agree to also '. However, the major powers may now be inclined to give a higher priority to stabilizing the frozen conflicts zones on the historic civilization fault- lines, such as in the Caucasus, so as to arrest the contagion of violence. If the conflict parties cannot reach agreement themselves, maybe the major powers will push harder, with 'Dayton diplomacy' representing a model of kinds.

How to give a new impetus, how devise a constructive and fresh framework for a concerted push to get solutions for the whole of the South Caucasus? Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem gave a lead yesterday at this conference. Using the language of Security or Stability Pact for the region as the general idea for getting a comprehensive improvement to the condition of the region, Minister Cem offered two approaches for consideration. The first approach consists of saying that it is not a good idea to try to begin with an overall strategic concept and framework, but rather to first make the peace in the several cont1ict zones. This is the approach that has been tested and so far failed, in the Caucasus and elsewhere. The second approach would turn the logic round, first to create the overarching framework, vision, incentives and negotiating structures, and set a process into motion. Then in separate sessions the outstanding conf1icts would be treated, with a view to getting, indeed pushing, and even perhaps forcing the solutions if absolutely necessary.
The scenario in a little more detail might be like this (Minister Cem has no responsibility for this extrapolation of his proposal).

A first conference of al1 the parties would be convened, presumably in the 3+ 3+ 2=8 format advocated already on several occasions by the leaders of the region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia; Iran, Russia, Turkey; EU and US), like these TESEV conferences have already been doing unofficial1y. Some format would also need to be found to involve the missing +3, namely representatives of the sub-state entities in question: Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia. They cannot be treated as internationally recognized states, which they are not. But they wil1 have to be party to the solutions.

At this first conference solemn declarations would be made of the determnination of al1 parties to solve the conf1icts, and to set the whole region onto a new path. The details at this stage would not be the point; rather it would be the occasion for al1 to see that the business now changes gear. This general conference of al1 the parties would then be followed by a conference of the parties concerned with one of the specific conf1icts, first probably Nagorno-Karabakh, and at which there would be a concerted drive for a solution. Subsequent conferences of the interested parties would concern
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At an appropriate stage the conference of al1 the parties would be reconvene to consider issues of pan-regional significance.

Can one go further at this stage on the substance? One can, as an unofficial and independent observer, try to sketch the process a little. It may be useful to i11ustrate what might be the difference between on the one hand first-best outcomes agreed by the parties and supported by the major powers, and on the other hand simpler solutions that the major powers might find themselves inclined towards if they had to take a greater responsibility for the outcome.

For Nagorno-Karabakh the starting point would be to table again the document that came out of Key West, but which fai1ed to be supported when the leaders got home.

The text of this document has not been made publicly available, but it has been widely commented on. One may schematize this document, or imagine another document with the following main points:

-A constitutional compromise defining the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh, which however at the level of international law does not become an independent state nor integrated into Armenia, but remains part of Azerbaijan.

-The "occupied territories" are returned to Azerbaijan, and refugees return there if they wish.

-Guaranteed access for transport corridors between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and between Nahkchevan and the rest of Azerbaijan.

-Maybe some secondary territoria1 adjustments as between Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding provinces ('occupied territories' of today).

-The above would surely be followed by a very welcome deblockading of Armenia by Turkey.

This formula hinges upon a real understanding of the nature of the constitutional compromise. This would be a delicate arrangement, as in all such cases where there has been ethno-cultural conflict.

An alternative scenario raised by various speeches and papers coming out of Bake is that Azerbaijan would insist on much more categorical power over Nagorno-Karabakh, even to the point of preparing for a new war to get it, as a last resort. This language and logic of war must be extremely disturbing for the international community. If there were another failure to agree over a Key West type solution, what would be the better alternative to war? The threat of war by one party would be taken negatively by the international community, in a situation in which the Nagorno - Karabakh story is not a black and white one. A simple alternative for the external powers might to be stick to the above model solution, with one exception. Thus there might be return of the occupied territories and the guaranteeing of the two corridors.

But, in the absence of a constitutional compromise, Nagorno-Karabakh would remain an autonomous non-recognized sub-state entity indefinitely, protected from attack by international security guarantee.

For the Abkhazia conference the starting point would be the 1997 proposals for a common state (advanced by Russia) or confederal solution. Abkhazia says that it could have lived with such a solution earlier, but now it is unacceptable, and wants outright independence (prime minister Djergenia speaking on Russian television a week ago). However this latter position is unacceptable to both Georgia and Russia. If something like the 1997 constitutional proposals could not be taken up again as a point of departure, an alternative solution could be to return to the 1998 project to allow a substantial number of Georgian refugees to return to the Gali district of Southern Georgia. This operation failed because of lack of adequate security; the combination of Russian peacekeepers and UN monitors did not handle the situation adequately. However now would be time to restructure the international peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia? The UN now has other priorities elsewhere. The mandate for Abkhazia could be transferred to OSCE, which would fit coherently with the OSCE missions in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Southern Ossetia. Russia talks of reconsidering its peacekeeping role in the Abkhazia in any case. The simple solution could then be:

-The Southern region would be re-opened for Georgians to return, and the district would be governed by Tbilisi. The frontier between Abkhazia and Georgia would be re-opened.

-There would be a new administrative border between Southern and Northern Abkhazia. The Abkhazian government in Sukhumi would control the Northern part as sub-state entity, without international recognition.

-The frontier between the two would be protected by an international peace-keeping force, whose composition would be decided in an OSCE framework.

With such a solution the whole of Abkhazia and its neighbors could begin to exploit wasted opportunities for economic and social progress. One outstanding investment opportunity, assuming security in Abkhazia, would be a new oil pipeline from Novorossisk to Supsa, thence to link back to the planned Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan trunk line (as already proposed by the Georgian state oil company -GIOC). Increasing volumes of North Caspian oil will in the next years be arriving in Novorossisk through the new CPC pipeline, and will have to reach Western markets somehow.

Trans-shipment across the Black Sea, and especially through the Phosphorous, is environmentally hazardous. This new pipeline link could be not only environmentally and economically advantageous; in addition it would be excellent material for a strengthened coalition of long-term mutual interests between Russia, Georgia and Turkey, putting finally to rest the old so-called 'Great Game' competitions 4.
The South Ossetia problem has for some time been the closest to solution, although the governance of this district continues to leave much to be desired (it lives as an irregular tax-free trading zone). However the peace is kept there by a soundly functioning coalition of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian troops, with OSCE supervision. A tidying up of the South Ossetia situation would still be in order, and would be likely to follow after a breakthrough regarding Abkhazia.

The Pankisi Gorge problem, however, has in the meantime become increasingly
Serious. Georgia has not succeeded in establishing law and order there,
notwithstanding the presence of OSCE observers on the frontier with Chechnya.
AA unknown number of Chechnya combat fighters are taking refuge in the Pankisi district. The Russian complaint over these people is now underlined buy the irregular incursions by Georgians and Chechnya's into the Khodori district. It is now overdue time to clean up in the Pankisi Gorge. If Georgia is unable to do this solely with its own security forces, it should be done with the aid of a small international contingent. Georgia might ask OSCE to-call for volunteering states for this purpose. Russia's participation in this situation should not be excluded.

Conclusions

-At a time when all eyes are on Afghanistan, it should not pass unnoticed that the Caucasus is sliding back into the language and therefore logic of war.

-It is probably not too late to reverse these negative developments, and to return to the logic of peaceful political compromise and normality, but for this to happen the diplomacy of the international community will have to move into higher gear.

-One of the consequences of 11 September is that the major powers are united as never before in a common cause to stop international violence, and to cooperate in handling the dangerous situations on the historic civilisational fault-lines.
-The Caucasus is one of these fault-lines. The major powers might together mount a fresh stabilization initiative for the Caucasus (the Turkish foreign minister made a suggestion yesterday).

-The conflict parties in the region, however, should be under no illusions. This would not remove the need for political compromise over matters of power structures in relation to ethnic groups and territory. There will be no 'victories ' if that means also the 'defeated'. 'Victory' can only work for all. Regional leaders should return to the negotiating table with the active support of the international community, best in a fresh, comprehensive and newly motivated framework.

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